Heavy Weather Ahead
About two hours into a three-hour flight, an air traffic controller advises the non-instrument-rated pilot of heavy precipitation ahead. The pilot acknowledges the info but says he’s going to try to fly around it. No further communications are received.
On October 18, 2013, about 1008 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-28R-180 operated by a private individual, was destroyed during impact with terrain, following a loss of control in cruise flight near Tifton, Georgia.
The private pilot was fatally injured. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed for the flight that departed Merritt Island Airport (COI), Merritt Island, Florida, about 0750; destined for LaGrange-Callaway Airport (LGC), LaGrange, Georgia.
The personal flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. According to information from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the flight was in radio and radar contact with Jacksonville Center while in cruise flight at 6,500 feet.
At 1000, the controller advised that accident flight: “…I am showing an area of heavy and moderate precip starting, ah, extending from your ten to two o’clock and approximately one four miles maintain VFR at all times.” The pilot acknowledged the transmission and stated, “Okay, maintain VFR I’ll pick around it a little bit…”
No further communications were received from the accident airplane. Between 1010:45 and 1011:40, the controller queried the accident flight three times as radar contact was lost.
Review of radar data revealed that the second-to-last radar target was recorded at 1007:46, indicating an altitude of 6,200 feet mean sea level (MSL), in an area of very light precipitation, and near an area of light to moderate precipitation. The last radar target was recorded 1008:10, with no associated altitude recorded, in the vicinity of the accident site. The last four radar targets were consistent with a descending right 180-degree turn.
A witness, who lived near the accident site, observed the airplane level as it flew over his house very fast, but then went straight down and impacted a field next to his property. He added that it was difficult to see the airplane in the low clouds and the engine noise was very loud. The witness further stated that just prior to impact, something from the airplane fell into the pond at his residence. The component the witness referred to was later presumed to be a separated and unrecovered right main landing gear.
The pilot, age 39, held a private pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine land. He did not possess an instrument rating. His most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued on August 4, 2012. Review of the pilot’s logbook revealed that he had accumulated about 163 total hours of flight experience; of which 1.7 hours were logged as simulated instrument experience and he had no documented actual instrument experience. He had flown 3.8 hours and zero hours during the 90-day and 30-day periods preceding the accident, respectively.
The four-seat, low-wing, retractable tricycle-gear airplane was manufactured in 1968. A Lycoming IO-360, 180-horsepower engine, equipped with a Hartzell constant-speed propeller, powered it. A review of the airplane’s logbooks revealed that its most recent annual inspection was completed on September 1, 2013.
At that time, the airplane had accumulated 6,169.47 total hours of operation. The engine had also accumulated 6,169.47 total hours and 1,307.47 hours since a major overhaul. According to the pilot’s logbook, the airplane had flown about one hour from the time of the last annual inspection, until the accident flight. There was no record of the pilot obtaining a weather briefing from flight service or direct user access terminal.
Henry Tift Myers Airport (TMA), Tifton, Georgia, is located about 11 miles southeast of the accident site. Fitzgerald Municipal Airport (FZG), Fitzgerald, Georgia, is located about 18 miles northeast of the accident site. The recorded weather at TMA, at 1015, was: wind calm; visibility 1.5 miles in light drizzle; temperature 21C; dew point 21C; altimeter 30.01 inches Hg. TMA did not record ceiling; however, the recorded ceiling at FZG, at 1015, was overcast ceiling at 400 feet.
Wreckage Information
The wreckage came to rest upright, was fragmented, on a heading about 270 degrees magnetic. An approximate 75-foot debris path was observed on a heading about 090-degrees, beginning with the engine and ending at the empennage. A fuel odor was noted and vegetation blight was observed throughout the entire debris path. The engine, separated propeller, and instrument panel were buried in an approximate six-by-six-by-three-foot deep impact crater. The cockpit area was crushed and resting on the side of the crater with the door, cabin roof, outboard section of left wing, and nosewheel. A mid-section of left wing was located about 20 feet along the debris path. The inboard section of the left and right wings were located near the end of the debris path.
The left main landing gear had partially separated from the left wing and the right main landing gear had completely separated from the right wing. The right main landing gear was not recovered and was presumed submerged in an adjacent pond. The left aileron and flap remained attached to the left wing and were compressed downward. The right aileron was destroyed and fragments of it, along with the right wingtip, were located about 20 feet north of the debris path. The right flap had also separated from the right wing and was recovered. The landing gear was observed in the extended position and the flaps in the retracted position. The empennage, rudder, and stabilator remained intact at the end of the debris path and exhibited crushing damage.
Control continuity was confirmed from the rudder, stabilator, and stabilator trim to the mid-cabin area, where the control cables were separated consistent with overstress. Measurement of the stabilator trim jackscrew revealed five threads, which equated to an approximate neutral setting. Continuity was confirmed from the right wing aileron bellcrank to the right wing root and the left aileron to the left wing root. The aileron cables were separated at their respective wing roots consistent with overstress. Instruments recovered from the instrument panel included: attitude indicator, panel mounted GPS, communication radio, VOR, and LOC/ILS. The gyro in the attitude indicator was disassembled for inspection. Rotational scoring was observed on the rotor and inside of the gyro housing.
The engine was recovered to a facility for further examination. The magnetos, oil sump, oil filter, and oil screen were not recovered. A partial teardown and examination of the engine revealed that the forward section of crankshaft exhibited a torsional separation. The crankshaft was also bent consistent with impact forces, which precluded rotation. All four cylinders were removed and no pre-impact mechanical malfunctions were observed. The No. 1 and No. 2 (front two) pistons were lodged in the engine due to the bent crankshaft. The propeller governor oil screen was removed and no metallic debris was observed. The fuel pump was destroyed; however, fuel was recovered in the fuel spider and fuel servo. The fuel was clear and consistent in odor with 100-low-lead aviation gasoline. Disassembly of the vacuum pump revealed that the rotor was fragmented, but the vanes were intact. Rotational scoring was observed on the inside of the pump housing.
Examination of the propeller revealed that one blade remained in the hub and one blade had separated. The separated blade exhibited S-bending, chord-wise scratching, and leading edge gouging. The blade that remained in the hub exhibited leading edge gouging.
Medical and Pathalogical Information
The Central Regional Georgia Bureau of Investigation’s Medical Examiner’s Office, Macon, Georgia, performed an autopsy on the pilot. The FAA Bioaeronautical Science Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicological testing on the pilot. Though the testing revealed low levels of ethanol in the kidney and liver, the levels may have been from postmortem production, and the absence of vitreous, blood, or urine samples limited the interpretation. Similarly, although diphenhydramine, a sedating antihistamine, was present in the liver and muscle, without appropriate specimens, the investigation could not determine if it was impairing at the time of the accident.
Given the presence of instrument meteorological conditions, including both degraded visibility and precipitation, and the pilot’s lack of an instrument rating, the pilot likely experienced spatial disorientation. Further, the circumstances of the accident, including the high descent rate over a confined area and the spiral descent are consistent with the presence of spatial disorientation.
Consequently, the National Transportation Safety Board determined the probable cause(s) of this accident to be the non-instrument-rated pilot’s improper decision to continue visual flight rules flight into known instrument meteorological conditions, which resulted in spatial disorientation and a loss of airplane control.
About The Author
For more information, in the U.S.A. (N.T.S.B.) The NTSB is an independent Federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the U.S. and significant accidents in other modes of transportation-railroad, highway, marine and pipeline. WEBSITE = http://www.ntsb.gov/ For more information, in CANADA (T.S.B.) The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) is an independent agency that advances transportation safety by investigating occurrences in the marine, pipeline, rail and air modes of transportation. WEBSITE = http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/
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